Concept Analysis Equal Protection Clause-Analysis

14th Amendment- Equal Protection Clause-Civil Rights Act 1964

Amendment XIV

Section 1: All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law, which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life liberty, or property without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

Equal Protection Clause: No State Shall... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. This was included by the Framers to guarantee the equality of protection of the laws given to blacks and whites. Equality with respect to civil rights meant equal status in the legal relations of the private economy, coupled with the right to enforce that equal status. Equality with respect to political rights was more controversial at the at the outset, with many supporters of equal civil rights opposed to equal voting rights for African Americans. This discrepancy was resolved by the passage of the 15th Amendment.

Equal protection laws can be described in two ways. First, the Court distinguishes between statutes that themselves utilize racial or other 'suspect" classifications, and statutes that though state in non-racial terms, nonetheless have a "disparate impact" on racial minorities. If the statutes use racial terms, they must survive strict scrutiny. The use of racial terms means that the legislature must be trying to promote extremely important social goals and the establishment of racial categories is essential if that goal is to be met. If this is not the objective, then the statutes have created suspect classes. If the statute does not name race classification yet its intent is still to deliver a disparate impact upon minorities, then strict scrutiny will apply. If the statute creates a disparate impact upon minorities but it is as a secondary effect, not the primary intent of the law, then strict scrutiny is not automatically triggered.

Suspect Classification: The Constitution only prohibits discrimination that is invidious, arbitrary, or irrational. The validity of the government action depends largely on the criterion on which the discrimination is based. All other classifications are suspect. The Court has declared that Race and Religion are suspect classes, thus any law that discriminates upon these classes will be deemed unconstitutional. The Court has yet to elevate gender to the level of suspect classification.

Strict Scrutiny: This is triggered when a law discriminates against a class that has fallen under suspect classification or is infringing upon a fundamental right. Under strict scrutiny, the burden of proof is upon the government to prove that the statute that is discriminatory seeks to achieve a compelling government interest, that which is far greater than an individual's rights. Very few laws pass the Strict Scrutiny test.

Intermediate or Heightened Scrutiny or Quasi-Suspect-Classification: This level of scrutiny requires that the government’s intent is only substantially related to an important government interest. This level would regulate social and economic classifications as well as statutes based upon age, sexual orientation, and physical or mental handicaps.

Rational Basis Test: The burden of proof is upon the individual attaching the law to sustain that the law is discriminatory. The justification of the discrimination can advance a social need without discriminating against individuals.

De facto discrimination or segregation- those actions of discrimination or segregation that take place by virtue of custom or social standard but are not enforced by law. Thus, situations of de facto discrimination or segregation can be remedied by an action of an individual or the introduction of legislation.

De jure discrimination or segregation- those actions of discrimination or segregation that are established and upheld by law.

The Civil Rights act of 1964

The Civil Rights Act of 1964 was a landmark piece of legislation in the United States that outlawed major forms of discrimination against blacks and women, including racial segregation. It ended unequal application of voter registration requirements and racial segregation in schools, at the workplace and by facilities that served the general public ("public accommodations"). Powers given to enforce the act were initially weak, but were supplemented during later years. Congress asserted its authority to legislate under several different parts of the United States Constitution, principally its power to regulate interstate commerce under Article One (section 8), its duty to guarantee all citizens equal protection of the laws under the Fourteenth Amendment and its duty to protect voting rights under the Fifteenth Amendment.

Title I
Barred unequal application of voter registration requirements, but did not abolish literacy tests sometimes used to disqualify African Americans and poor white voters.

Title II
Outlawed discrimination in hotels, motels, restaurants, theaters, and all other public accommodations engaged in interstate commerce; exempted private clubs without defining "private," thereby allowing a loophole.

Title III
Encouraged the desegregation of public schools and authorized the U. S. Attorney General to file suits to force desegregation, but did not authorize busing as a means to overcome segregation based on residence.

Title IV
Authorized but did not require withdrawal of federal funds from programs which practiced discrimination.

Title V
Outlawed discrimination in employment in any business exceeding twenty five people and creates an Equal Employment Opportunities Commission to review complaints, although it lacked meaningful enforcement powers.

Title VI

Prevents discrimination by government agencies that receive federal funds. If an agency is found in violation of Title VI, that agency can lose its federal funding

Title VII

Title VII of the Act prohibits discrimination by covered employers on the basis of race, color, religion, sex or national origin. Title VII also prohibits discrimination against an individual because of his or her association with another individual of a particular race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. An employer cannot discriminate against a person because of his interracial association with another, such as by an interracial marriage

Title VIII

Required compilation of voter-registration and voting data in geographic areas specified by the Commission on Civil Rights.

Title IX

Title IX made it easier to move civil rights cases from state courts with segregationist judges and all-white juries to federal court. This was of crucial importance to civil rights activists who could not get a fair trial in state courts.

Special Note:

Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 is an amendment to Title IX of the Civil Rights Act of 1964: "No person in the U.S. shall, on the basis of sex be excluded from participation in, or denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any educational program or activity receiving federal aid."

Title X

Established the Community Relations Service, tasked with assisting in community disputes involving claims of discrimination.

Title XI

Title XI gives the Jury rights to put any proceeding for criminal contempt arising under title II, III, IV, V, VI, or VII of the Civil Rights Act, on trial, and if convicted, can be fined no more than $1,000 or imprisoned for more than six months

The First Test of the Equal Protection Clause

Yick Wo v. Hopkins, (1886),

This is the first case where the United States Supreme Court ruled that a law that is race-neutral on its face, but is administered in a prejudicial manner, is an infringement of the Equal Protection Clause in the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.

Background

In the 1880s, Chinese immigrants to California faced many legal and economic hurdles, including discriminatory provisions in the California Constitution. As a result, they were excluded, either by law or by bias, from many professions. Many turned to the laundry business and in San Francisco about 89% of the laundry workers were of Chinese descent.

In 1880, the city of San Francisco passed an ordinance that persons could not operate a laundry in a wooden building without a permit from the Board of Supervisors. The ordinance conferred upon the Board of Supervisors the discretion to grant or withhold the permits. At the time, about 95% of the city's 320 laundries were operated in wooden buildings. Approximately two-thirds of those laundries were owned by Chinese persons. Although most of the city's wooden building laundry owners applied for a permit, none were granted to any Chinese owner, while only one out of approximately eighty non-Chinese applicants was denied a permit.

Yick Wo who had lived in California and had operated a laundry in the same wooden building for many years and held a valid license to operate his laundry issued by the Board of Fire-Wardens, continued to operate his laundry and was convicted and fined $10.00 for violating the ordinance. He sued for a writ of habeas corpus after he was imprisoned in default for having refused to pay the fine.

Issue before the Court

The state argued that the ordinance was strictly one out of concern for safety, as laundries of the day often needed very hot stoves to boil water for laundry, and indeed laundry fires were not unknown and often resulted in the destruction of adjoining buildings as well.

However, the petitioner pointed out that prior to the new ordinance, the inspection and approval of laundries in wooden buildings had been left up to fire wardens. Yick Wo's laundry had never failed an inspection for fire safety. Moreover, the application of the prior law focused only on laundries in crowded areas of the city, while the new law was being enforced on isolated wooden buildings as well. The law also ignored other wooden buildings where fires were common—even cooking stoves posed the same risk as those used for laundries.

Opinion of the Court

The Court, in a unanimous opinion written by Justice Matthews, found that the administration of the statute in question was discriminatory and that there was therefore no need to even consider whether the ordinance itself was lawful. Even though the Chinese laundry owners were usually not American citizens, the court ruled they were still entitled to equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. Justice Matthews also noted that the court had previously ruled that it was acceptable to hold administrators of the law liable when they abused their authority. He denounced the law as a blatant attempt to exclude Chinese from the laundry trade in San Francisco, and the court struck down the law, ordering dismissal of all charges against other laundry owners who had been jailed.